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THE TENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY:
CREATING
AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER.
By Walter F. Murphy. 1 The Johns Hopkins University
Press. 2007. Pp. xviii-547. $55.00.
George Thoma/
In The Federalist. No. 1, Alexander Hamilton, noting that
the people were "called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America," insisted that the "subject
speaks of its own importance."' Hamilton would quickly cast this
in sweeping terms suggesting-in a phrase I am hesitant to quote
as it is called forth so frequently I fear making it trite- that in
deliberating on the Constitution the people were deciding
whether government could be constructed by "reflection and
4
choice" and not simply by way of "accident and force." Yet in
the closing paper of The Federalist, No. 85, Hamilton would
make some concession to accident, openly acknowledging that
the Constitution came from imperfect hands under imperfect
circumstances: "I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to
any the revolution has produced."' Here Hamilton captured the
peculiar nature of modern constitution making at its birth. Modern constitutionalism is a self-consciously reasoned attempt to
bring a polity into being. And yet, in doing so, a constitution
must accommodate the particular people it is created for, bending here and there to their habits, opinions, and circumstances:
that is to say, to accident if not force. In just this manner, a constitution may embrace universal principles, but it does so for a
I. McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritus. Princeton Universitv.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Profess~r Thomas
is author of The Madisonian Constitlllion (forthcoming. Johns Hopkins University Press).
3. THE FEDERALIST. NO. I. at I (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 199'1).
4. /d.
5. THE FEDERALIST. NO. 85. at 491 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 1999).
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particular people, marking its boundaries by way of the people,
even while attempting to cultivate and sustain that people's attachment to the constitution. 6
Needless to say, this is a difficult and complex enterprise. If
we take The Federalist seriously, looking "forward with trembling anxiety" to the completion of the American Constitution,
whether our great experiment has been entirely successful is an
7
open question. It is one thing to create a constitutional democracy, no easy task, it is quite another to sustain it, as Abraham
Lincoln noted on the eve of the Civil War.x And it is, in a sense,
a perpetual endeavor. It is this fraught enterprise that Walter
Murphy's Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a
Just Political Order sets out to capture. McCormick Professor of
Jurisprudence Emeritus at Princeton University, Murphy is one
of the most influential constitutional scholars of the twentieth
century-Justice Samuel Alito is a former student- and a decorated Marine.~ As if that were not enough, in the midst of his
academic career, Murphy also penned several very successful
novels, most notably The Vicar of Christ, which, as it happens,
did not center on the small world of academic infighting and romance.10 With Constitutional Democracy Murphy returns to
more standard scholarly fare- even as he draws on his skills as a
novelist in the opening half of the book- giving us a fitting capstone to such an illustrious career.
Constitutional Democracy is an extraordinarily ambitious
book, taking as its model nothing less than Aristotle's Politics (if
operating in more circumscribed terrain). In this, it brings together a blend of the theoretical and empirical that captures the
sort of political science practiced by Montesquieu and Tocqueville and traced to Aristotle in its understanding of a re-

6. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (1993).
7. THE FEDERALIST. No. 85. at 495.(Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 1999).
8. Abraham Lincoln. First Inaugural. in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS (Roy P. Basler ed .• 2001) (hereinafter BASLER).
9. Most prominently. Murphy has given birth to the '"Princeton'" school in constitutional thought. leading essays of which are gathered together in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS (Robert P. George & Sotirios A. Barber eds .• 2001) and the casebook
AMERICA!'\ CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Walter Murphy, et al. eds., 2003). He
is also the intellectual godfather to studies of "strategic'" judicial decision-making. pioneered by his WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964), and was a
pioneer as well in the comparative study of law and courts, see WALTER MURPHY &
JOSEPH T ANENHAUS. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977).
10. WALTER MURPHY. THE VICAR OF CHRIST (1979).
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gime. 11 Murphy's general analysis seeks to illuminate how constitutional democracy is created, maintained, and changed. Yet
these analytical distinctions are brought to life by an empirical
and comparative analysis that is remarkable in its breadth and
erudition. Murphy moves seamlessly between political philosophy and the concrete circumstances of particular regimes. We
thus come to understand constitutional democracy as it is manifest in particular regimes and our understanding is deepened by
comparing and contrasting these regimes. Inevitably, the overarching nature of Murphy's project marks a general path and defense of constitutional democracy, offering puzzles for us to
ponder and weigh, without giving us easy answers.

***
Murphy begins with the fictional nation of Nusquam, a nation just delivered from tyrannical government, as it undertakes
the process of creating a new regime. In the first three-fifths of
the book we follow the imaginary founders of this polity as they
attempt to construct an order that is both just and possible given
the not particularly fortuitous circumstances of Nusquam. The
delegates debate the merits of alternative political systems,
weighing issues of justice and morality against practical political
concerns: what can politics realistically achieve, how should
moral disagreements be dealt with, what will this particular people at this particular time be willing to accept? Murphy frames
this opening section as a Socratic dialogue of sorts to let the issues speak for themselves. Yet the dialogue, in the form of the
convention debate, does not exert a force of its own, ineluctably
drawing us to certain questions, and entertaining us with the
charm and wit of the exchange. It does not come to life in the
manner of a Platonic dialogue. Indeed, the dialogue is interspersed with lectures from professors who speak to alternative
political systems and, as we descend to particulars, the various
elements at play within constitutional democracy.
In these debates, we hear the voices of modern thinkersRobert Dahl, Richard Posner, John Rawls, and Robert George
are a few obvious examples- brought to life by various dele-

11. ARISTOTLE. THE POLITICS (Stephen Everson ed .. 19RR): MONTESQUIEU. THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne Cohler. Basia Miller & Harold Stone eds .. 19R9): ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop.
trans .. 2000). For an insightful discussion of this sort of political science. see JAMES W.
CEASER. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE ( 1990).

796

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:793

12

gates. Murphy makes one professor all too real in delivering a
flat lecture that requires, quite literally in the book, espressos all
the way around to hold the delegates' attention. One can feel the
collective discomfort of the room and is not altogether pleased
to be subject to it. This is so even when those professors whose
lectures are seasoned with wit and eloquence interrupt the dialogue and step to the lectern. It also captures a truth about modern constitution making: academics, most notably law professors,
have been, for good or ill, a highly visible presence at recent constitutional conventions, seeking to educate would-be constitution
makers by instructing them on the virtues and vices of different
electoral systems, bills of rights, and judicial review, to name a
few of the issues Murphy highlights. 13 This does, I suppose, cast
the convention in a more realistic light. If ideal founders would
be "both philosophers and statesman," this is a combination
rarely seen at actual constitutional conventions. As Murphy himself says. "it is unlikely that either learned scholars or experienced statesman would look on this group as exemplary models
for constitutional engineers'' (p. 325).
Thus, despite the opening dialogue form, reading Constitutional Democracy is more like reading Aristotle than Plato. This
is fitting in that Murphy's understanding of the constitutional enterprise draws deeply on Aristotle, going so far as to define a
constitution as "a way of life" (p. 13). And even while Murphy
thinks of constitutionalism in modern terms as a "normative political creed" that places limits on governmental power, he insists
that this inevitably shapes the nature and character of a given
regime- that is, its way of life. Murphy thus does not defend
constitutionalism- as liberalism is at times defended- as "value
neutral. " 14 On the contrary, it rests squarely on substantive values, which inexorably shape the nature and character of the political community.

***
The essence of constitutional democracy. according to Murphy, is that it recognizes the "equal dignity'' of human beings, in12. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989): ROBERT A. DAHL.
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001): JOHN RAWLS. A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993): RICHARD A.
POSNER. THE PROBLEMATIC'S OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); ROBERT P.
GEORGE. MAKING MEN MORAL ( 1993).
13. CASS R. SUNSTEIN. DESIGNING DEMOCRACY (2002).
14. See. for example. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON. WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOC'RACY 0 (2004). which builds on RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM. supra note 12.
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eluding "a wide degree of individual liberty.'' Constitutionalism
insists on settling some moral issues first, while democracy lets
them be settled by process. This blend of constitutionalism and
democracy is in tension with itself, and thus requires particular
care in being nurtured. This tension, though, can be healthy:
rather than settling political conflict, it channels and institutionalizes it, giving the people a stake in self-government, by making
the stakes low enough to provide for stability and unity. True, at
first blush, many sympathetic readers of Murphy will pause, if
not groan, over the phrase "equal dignity." It need not be so.
The phrase has surely been abused and often in the name of
making unequal things equal in dignity. But in some sense the
recognition of equal dignity is an apt characterization of a polity
that attempts to empower and limit government: it is created by
human beings for human beings, precisely because human beings
are neither gods nor beasts. Even if human beings are not equal
in all aspects of moral worth, this does not entail the claims of
some to rule others.
Such an understanding threads its way through Thomas Jefferson's thought. We see it in his "Summary View of the Rights
of British America," where he insists that every individual
American colonist is equal to every British elector in "virtue, in
understanding, and in bodily strength;" in the Declaration of Independence's "self-evident truth" that "all men are created
equal;" and it may be said to culminate in Jefferson's insistence
on "the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been
born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and
spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God." 1'
Lincoln repeatedly turned to Jefferson's understanding in rejecting slavery and arguing for the experiment of self-government,
going so far as to declare: "I have never had a feeling politically
that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Decla1
ration of Independence." " He would point to it, again and again,
in arguing for the equal dignity of blacks as he attempted to persuade his fellow Americans of the evils of slavery and the fact
that it degraded both blacks and whites. And he cast his argu15. THOMAS JEFFERSON. A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH
AMERICA (1774). reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 435-41. at 437 (PHILIP
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds .. 1987): Thomas Jefferson. Declaration of Independence
( 1776 ). reprinted in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS. supra note 3. at 528: Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman. (June 24. 1826). in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS
1516--17 (Merrill D. Peterson ed .. 1984).
16. Abraham Lincoln. Address in Independence Hall. Philadelphia. February 22.
1861 in BASLER. supra note 8. at 577.
·
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ment in terms of "'equal dignity," insisting that, "in the right to
eat the bread. without the leave of anybody else, which his own
hand earns, he [the Negro] is my equal and the equal of Judge
Douglas. and the equal of every living man. '' 17
For Lincoln such a right flowed from the natural rights of all
human beings. Murphy hesitates, however, to found constitutional democracy on natural rights. While he insists upon limits
that stem from some notion of right, he is skeptical of so-called
negative constitutionalism, affirming a positive constitutional vision that poses an obligation and duty to "assist citizens in
achieving good and just lives." 1x This understanding is most visible when Murphy's delegates debate abortion and the logic of a
"perfectionist state.'' In each instance, the concern for promoting
moral character and the process of "human moral improvement"
is played out in terms of the value and dignity of human life. If,
in this Socratic enterprise. Murphy's own understandings are
never wholly clear, his discussion makes clear that recognizing
the ··equal dignity'' of human beings does not prohibit the polity
from making moral judgments. 1y It may. in fact, invite sterner
judgments than one usually associates with constitutional democracy. At times it even seemed that Murphy was swept away
by these "aspirational" elements of constitutional democracy to
the neglect of its grounding in the limits of politics. But at these
moments, Murphy usually swerved, insisting on positive constitutional aspirations, but tempering them with a prudent assessment of constitutional limits and possibilities, yielding a rough
20
balance of aspirations and limits.

***
For Murphy this combination of aspirations and limits is
central to understanding and interpreting a constitution-

17. Abraham Lincoln, First Joint Debate, in THE LiNCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 53
(Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965).
18. On positive constitutionalism. see SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2003).
19. This makes Murphy's argument for constitutional democracy rather different
from RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, or somewhat similar arguments
such as RONALD DWORKIN. fREEDOM'S LAW (1996), which both begin from a notion of
''equal concern" or respect.
20. See GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986), for a critique of "aspirational" accounts such as
Ronald Dworkin ·s. which tend toward general moral aspirations, which are rooted in
abstract moral theorizing about equality, and must be distinguished from constitutional
aspirations, which inhere in the political principles the document itself rests upon. Accordingly. not all moral aspirations are equally constitutional aspirations.
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whether or not it is written. A written constitution may be a
sham that in no way captures the actual nature of the government-its real constitution-as in Stalin's Soviet Union. Alternatively, constitutional democracy does not require a formally written constitution. Not only is there Britain's unwritten
Constitution, and Israel's, but the Declaration itself speaks of
violations of "our constitution" prior to America having a written constitution. 21 Given this, Murphy suggests a distinction between a constitutional text and a constitutional order as they are
not coterminous.
Even turning to written constitutions, putative "strict" textualists must make sense of particular provisions in light of the
whole constitution, which requires them to understand more
than its particular clauses. Or if we turn to original meaning as
central to maintaining a written constitution, we move beyond
the text to capture the true meaning of the words and how the
words, situated within the whole of the constitution, apply in the
circumstances before us. Interestingly, the insistence that one
must never move beyond the text stems from a narrow modern
legal positivist bent of mind that doubts what Hamilton called
"the reasoning spirit. " 22 Perhaps most prominently, Hugo Black
and Robert Bork capture this furnishing of mind in insisting that
whenever we depart from the letter of the text, we turn the only
place we can, inward, to our own subjective desires: to what Justice Black, conflating "natural law" and "judicial will," mistak23
enly called a "natural law ... excrescence on the constitution."

21. It might be said that Israel. with its series of written Basic Laws, now has a written constitution. But, even if granted. this would suggest some difference between a formal written constitution and a series of Basic Laws that might move in that direction. It
would also beg the question: did Israel have a constitution prior to the passage of the Basic Laws? It would certainly be plausible to argue that it did. See. for example.
JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD, supra note 6.
22. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 78 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
23. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,75 (1947). See also, ROBERT H. BORK. THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-41, 265 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil. 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). As Scalia argues. "Now the main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution-or, for that matter. in judicial interpretation of any
law-is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the Jaw. Avoiding this
error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge
ever succeeds entirely." !d. at 863. Originalism and textualism are put forward by Bork
and Scalia as the only way to obviate this problem. There are, of course. legal positivists
who take a different view. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) and the
famous Hart exchange with Lon Fuller. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958): Lon L. Fuller. Positivism and Fidelitv to
Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). See also BRIAN z.
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004 ).
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This move to constitutional text divorced from its presuppositions oddly inverts the project of a written constitution: the
whole of a constitution is viewed through the lens of the judiciary as if the purpose of a written constitution was to bind judges.
Yes. movements beyond the text have been much abused by
judges. But Bork himself commits such textual abuses in describing the ninth amendment, and the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth, as textual "inkblots." 24 As does Black,
in whose hands the "text" of the Constitution becomes portions
of the Bill of Rights to the neglect of the Constitution itself. This
speaks to Murphy's longstanding insistence that we must analytically separate the question of "what" a constitution is from
"who., may interpret it, as constitutions operate far beyond the
25
courts and. hence, must be understood independently of them.
We might gain a better sense of what it means to take a constitutional text seriously, even while rooting it in deeper constitutional principles, in thinking that the fixed principles of a constitution are to be applied in changing circumstances. In moving
beyond the written constitution to the philosophical principles
antecedent to it, we do not turn to an empty and unreasoned
world where anything goes, but to a disciplined and reasoned enterprise that seeks to draw out principles that inhere in the constitution itself. And, as Murphy insists, this is not a task for the
judiciary alone, as the other branches of government (and even
the people themselves) interpret a constitution. In fact, many recent constitutions have provisions that are not subject to judicial
interpretation. The Irish Constitution, for example, explicitly
prohibits judicial enforcement of some provisions, leaving the
enforcement of these provisions to the judgment of the legislature and the people. Thus, the most powerful expounders of constitutions do not always sit on the bench. Murphy is absolutely
right. I think, in arguing that the most important act of constitutional interpretation in American history is Lincoln's First Inaugural, which begins from constitutional text but connects it to the
26
very nature of the Union that the text was meant to serve.
24. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 100th Congress.
First Session 249 (19R7). See also RANDY BARNETT. RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION (2004).
25. Walter F. Murphy. Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 4R REV. POLITICS 41 (1986). See also GEORGE THOMAS. THE
MADISON IAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming. Johns Hopkins University Press).
2o. Abraham Lincoln. First Inaugural Address. March 4. 1861 in BASLER. supra
note R. at 578-RS.
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Thus, while a written text may provide a means of limiting
government, establishing rights, and settling some forms of disagreement, it has its foundation in being intelligible to the people and their representatives. As Murphy's Professor Deukalion
of Princeton ventures, "The debates, arguments, even turmoil
that proposing a constitutional charter breeds will provide superb instruction for your people. They can begin to learn to be
citizens of a constitutional democracy by acting like citizens of a
constitutional democracy" (p. 193). If the written constitution is
not fostered by political institutions and citizens, it will become,
27
in Madison's phrase, a mere "parchment barrier."

***
In taking up how to foster and maintain constitutional democracy, Murphy begins with "creating" and educating citizens,
noting, following Aristotle, that "the 'excellence of the citizen
must be an excellence relative to the constitution"' (p. 342). This
requires the forging of a national identity that, depending on the
particular regime, may also entail attempts to change the political culture, altering the habits and beliefs of individuals. Such a
delicate endeavor must teach citizens how to reason and think
about politics. Insofar as constitutionalism has universal aspirations, this also entails the hopeful development of human beings
as such. Let me hasten to add that for Professor Murphy this
does not entail turning religious believers into Rawlsian deliberative democrats. Yet he is also shrewd enough to note the
value of civic belief, drawing on Madison's insistence that the
"prejudices" of the community are beneficial in sustaining a regime.28 Even if constitutional democracy is a reasoned endeavor,
not all citizens will embrace it in such terms and not all elements
of the regime will be brought about by reason.
"Accident," in Hamilton's terms, is ever present in the profoundly different forms constitutional democracy may take.
Murphy's comparative political science is illuminated by Montesquieu's observation that the laws of different regimes "should
relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain. " 29
This depends on the conditions and culture of a particular place.
Throughout the book, Murphy turns to comparative examples to
illustrate how different polities have wrestled with similar problems. The liberty that each polity can sustain differs. Surely this
27.
28.
29.

THE FEDERALIST. NO. 48. (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 1999).
THE FEDERALIST. NO. 49 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 1999).
MONTESQUIEL!, supra note 11. Book I. ch. 3. at 9.
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is something we should understand as America attempts to construct a constitutional democracy in Iraq. What would be inappropriate and illiberal in America, may well by reasonable and
just in Iraq. This is not an embrace of moral relativism. Murphy's
constitutional delegates debate the issue in illuminating ways,
with the relativists coming in for a drubbing by, in many cases,
religious believers offering philosophical arguments. Rather, it is
to recognize that the same general principles will have different
applications depending on the peculiar characteristics of a nation's political culture. Knowing that principles must accommodate "accident," Murphy's insists throughout, is to recognize
prudence as a driving force in politics.
This insistence leads Murphy to take up the vexing issues
that new constitutional democracies wrestle with in nearly forcing people to be free, creating and rebuilding "the machinery of
state," and dealing with deposed tyrants. Prudence may require
that an emerging people's liberty be limited, or that the evils of
the past go unpunished. At an abstract level, such decisions may
be at odds with justice, but insofar as imperfect human beings
are attempting to forge a just form of government in imperfect
circumstances, such moves may be justified-may even be just.
Sustaining a fragile constitutional democracy may lead us to
prohibit political parties and political speech that advocate the
overturning of the constitutional order. Surely, many will respond, we cannot limit the rights of speech and association,
which are often taken to be foundational to constitutional democracy. Murphy suggests otherwise, drawing on "Article 21 of
Germany's Basic Law, which recognizes a right to form parties, ... but ... authorizes the Constitutional Court to hold them
unconstitutional if they seek 'to impair or abolish the free democratic order or to endanger the existence"' of the nation (p.
522). Even if we would rather not restrict the political process, or
prefer to allow widespread speech, it would be foolish to do so if
it genuinely threatens to undermine a constitutional democracy,
replacing it with tyranny. A constitutional democracy is not required to "quietly submit to assassination" (p. 524). In drawing
out this elementary lesson, Murphy also rejects the notion that
what binds and legitimizes government is consent by way of the
democratic process. If the people elect a tyranny, it does not
make a tyranny legitimate.
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Casting an eye to this occurrence in Weimar Germany, we
should not trust in pious maxims that "truth" will always win out
in the "competition of the market."'" An established constitutional democracy, like the United States, may let the advocates
of violently overthrowing the constitutional order have their say.
But such a judgment is prudential. As a matter of principle, a
constitutional democracy may find it necessary to insist that political parties and political speech accord with the foundations of
the constitutional order. No doubt, this should include an expanse of political understandings, but it does have very real limits-all the more so in emerging regimes where parties that actively reject the essence of constitutionalism and democracy may
be prohibited.
Murphy's timely discussion of "emergency powers" might
also be viewed from this angle. Since the inception of the American Constitution, which provides for the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus in times of crisis, many written constitutions
have provided more elaborate textual guidance as a way of invoking and limiting emergency powers. In some sense, this may
provide for "constitutional dictatorship," but attempts to keep it
1
constitutiona/.' While there is the risk that extraordinary powers
will be abused, there is the recognition that there are occasions
when the polity truly is at risk. Lincoln, characteristically, cut to
the heart of the matter: "is it possible to lose the nation, yet preserve the constitution?"'c At the same time, as Lincoln insisted,
in saving the nation, we want to keep it "worthy of the saving.'"'
As Murphy puts it, "What doth it profit citizens of a constitutional democracy to preserve national security at the cost of becoming denizens of a police state?" (p. 494 ). Perhaps most famously, the Weimar constitution enabled the government, by
way of Article 48, to authorize emergency powers that allowed
for the suspension of certain constitutional provisions. The tex-

30. Abrams v. United States. 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). As
John Milton famously argued, "And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to
play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to
the wors. in a free and open encounter." JOHN MILTON. AREOGAGITICA AND OTHER
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON 45 (1999).
31. CLINTON ROSSITER. CONSTITUTIO!'AL DICTATORSHIP (2002). See also JOHN
E. FINN, COto;STITUTIONS IN CRISIS (1991).
32. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session. July 4. 1861 in
BASLER. supra note 8. at 598.
33. Abraham Lincoln. The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Propriety
of its Restoration: Speech at Peoria. Illinois. October 16. 1854 in BASLER, supra note 8.
at 315.
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tual and historical arguments that persist in regard to the Weimar constitution. as well as the often elaborate incorporation of
emergency powers in recently drafted constitutions, do not provide easy answers to such vexing questions. Article 48, it has
been suggested. was used effectively in the early years of Weimar to maintain the constitutional order. Yet it is also undeniable that the frequent invocation of a "state of exception" 34 in
the latter years of Weimar provided, at the least, a bridge to the
dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.
While a constitutional text might explicitly command that
public policies conform to "constitutionalism's basic principles,"
Murphy illustrates that the dilemmas of sustaining a constitutional democracy in the face of genuine threats, both internal
and external, are not easily amenable to textual solutions. The
trouble with the Weimar Republic may be best symbolized by
Thomas Mann's quip that "it was a republic without republicans." illuminating Murphy's insistence on the centrality of creating constitutional citizens (p. 166). This also lends powerful
support to Murphy's insistence that constitutional interpretation
and maintenance are duties of all the branches of government: a
constitution is more likely to be maintained if each branch acts
to uphold it. Just as we cannot trust in a written text alone, neither can we trust that courts will preserve constitutional government for us. Thus while the particular form of the American
separation of powers is not a constitutional necessity, such an
understanding illustrates how some version of separated powers,
refusing to repose trust in any one center, is at the root of constitutionalism.

***
Such an understanding of constitutionalism also raises questions of its inherent limits, which brings me to one of the most
interesting puzzles in Murphy's book: can an amendment to a
constitution, even though it adheres to formal procedures, be
unconstitutional? Murphy's argument, that procedurally correct
amendments can still be unconstitutional, cuts to the essence of
constitutional democracy. As Murphy explains, there is a
difference between amending and replacing a constitutional
text or constitutional order. The word amend comes from the
Latin emendere. to correct. Thus an 'amendment' corrects or
modifies a system without fundamentally changing its na-

34.

CARL ScH:-.11TL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1985).

2007]

BOOK REVIEWS

805

ture- that is, an amendment operates within the boundaries
of the existing constitutional order. Abolishing constitutional
democracy and substituting a different system would not be
an amendment at aiL but a re-creation, a re-forming, not simply of political structures but also of the people themselves (p.
506).

A constitutional amendment cannot swallow the constitutional
order whole, as the substantive principles the constitution rests
upon limit the text of the constitution and how the people may
act within the confines of that order.
No doubt, those taking their bearings from legal positivism
and "pure" forms of popular sovereignty will find such an argument astonishing. But if we take our bearings from constitutionalism itself, it is not an altogether remarkable argument; indeed,
it seems only necessary to recognize certain principles to grasp
the wisdom of Murphy's insistence. The people may. in a "revolutionary act," alter or abolish a particular constitution. but such
an act takes place "outside" the confines of a particular constitution.''
But even here, that is, in revolutionary and not constitutional terms, the people are limited. "As the German Constitutional Court carefully explained in its very first opinion: 'That a
constitutional provision itself may be null and void is not conceptually impossible ... There are constitutional principles that are
so fundamental ... that they also bind the framer of the constitution, and other constitutional provisions that do not rank so high
may be null and void because they contravene these principles"'
(p. 503). Though it comes from a different angle, such an understanding is evinced by Lincoln's repeated insistence that we must
understand the Constitution- particularly its textual provisions
allowing for, if not approving of, slavery- in light of the Declaration of Independence's insistence that "all men are created
equal." This put certain textual provisions of the Constitution at
odds with the Constitution's foundational identity. It was the
task of Lincoln's statesmanship to bring the textual provisions
into line with the essentials of the constitutional order, which
were expressed not in the written text, but in the fundamental
principles underlying that text.

35. See also CARL SCHMITT. LEGALITY AND LEGITI\IACY 51\ (2004): ··When a constitution envisions the possibility of constitutional revisions. the constitution does not
intend to provide. for example. a legal method for the elimination of its own legaJitv. still
less the legitimate means to the destruction of its legitimacy.··
'
·
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Lincoln insisted on a similar point outside of the formal
constitution, when he insisted that slavery was not something the
people should vote up or down. Liberty, rather, was the precondition to self-government. Thus, for Lincoln, even if the people
are acting in "revolutionary" rather than "constitutional" terms,
they are bound. Murphy's insistence on the limits of consent,
even when the people are acting in "revolutionary" and not
''constitutional'" terms, is at the root of his understanding of constitutional democracy; indeed, it is what fundamentally distinguishes constitutional democracy from representative democracy.
And yet. even while pressing this point, Lincoln insisted that
he was bound by the particular constitutional text even if it was,
at root, at odds with the essence of the American constitutional
order. As Murphy illustrates. this paradox threads its way
through constitutional democracy as a regime that embraces
such tensions in an effort to create a just political order for human beings in the here and now.
If the aims of constitutional democracy. as it has aptly been
put, are low. its achievements are not. It is high praise, then, to
say that Professor Murphy's Constitutional Democracy does justice to its subject.

